| 1. Prologue I. Singapore
and Kobe,
with comments on Tomakomai
As part of the sustained interaction UNFPA has had with Japan,
Dr.
Hirofumi Ando visited Kobe in the early 1980s. He was taken by the
remarkable strategy that was then coming to fruition in "Port Island,"
the man-made island that was to be a remarkable solution to Kobe's
major problem, the limits of space.*1 Ando's visit brought
a convergence of a number of lines of thinking. First, UNFPA was as
usual looking beyond the narrow confines of family planning to consider
the population problem in its broader dimensions, one of the more
pressing of which was urbanization. Another line came from Ando's long
association with, and studies of, Southeast Asia. He wondered if Kobe
might provide something of a model, not to be adopted, but to be
adapted, to address port city problems in Southeast Asia. The first
step in considering such a strategy would be to learn more about Kobe's
development, and other port city developments, through a systematic
comparative study. What in Southeast Asia might be an appropriate city
for such a comparison?
After some discussion, it was decided to undertake a comparative study
of Singapore and Kobe, with observations as well from another new and
developing port city, Tomakomai, in Hokkaido. Working with a long term
associate in the Nihon University Population Research Institute and its
director, Professor Toshio Kuroda, UNFPA put together a collaborative
team of social scientists from Singapore, Kobe, Hokkaido, Tokyo, and
the University of Michigan in the USA. The idea was to undertake a
brief survey of population and development in the three port cities,
drawing on local scholars and urban administrators to tell the stories
of these three ports: What were the major constraints of the port city?
What vision arose to address those problems? What were the major
population issues in these cities? What development efforts were
devised to deal with the combined population and development problems?
How were the development efforts planned and organized, and how were
they financed? Were there common processes or lessons that could be
learned from these three cities, which might be useful for other Asian
urban administrators?
Teams from each of the three cities gathered data and wrote their
analyses over about six months from June to December, 1985. In planning
the study, it was decided to draw on secondary materials and some
interviews, focusing on the history of population and development over
roughly the period 1960 to the present. The starting year was selected
because it was then that both cities began to embark on their concerted
population-development efforts. By the end of 1985 draft papers had
been prepared, a draft comparative overview was written, and the teams
met in Singapore to review the work. Papers were then revised and
edited, and published by the Nihon University Population Research
Institute.
Dramatic differences in Singapore and Kobe made the similarities of the
development process important. Singapore has been a major entrepot for
all of Southeast Asia for well over a century. Most of its current
character can be traced, however, to the period since 1961-5.*2
Kobe has been one of Japan's leading ports since shortly after the
Meiji restoration. As a leading sea port, it had considerable influence
in the national government, but it was still that government that
controlled much of the country's general and very aggressive
development strategy of the 1960s.
Both cities faced major problems of urban crowding, unsatisfactory
housing, shortage of land for new (or even in some cases existing)
industry, and severe strains on their inadequate port facilities in
this period of rapid expansion of world trade. But Kobe's constraints
came more from geography, while those of Singapore came from geography
and past planning strategies. Kobe is bordered on the north by a range
of the Rokko mountains, and on the south by the deep waters of Osaka
Bay. The city is pressed into a narrow band running over 20 kilometers
from east to west, and only about 4 kilometers wide between the sea and
the mountains. There was literally no place to go. Singapore's
geographic problems lay in its long shelving beach front, which
deprived it of the natural deep waters that Kobe enjoyed. Thus ships
stood out in the roads and were loaded and unloaded by barges or
lighters from the city. Administratively Singapore had been broken into
two units by the British colonial government: the island, and the city.
If the city were increasingly crowded by the rapidly growing
population, the city government had few resources, and little
administrative capacity, to provide housing outside of the central city.
Their demographic histories also placed the two cities in quite
different positions at the beginning of their major development spurts.
In 1950 Japan was well on its way through the demographic transition,
while Singapore was just beginning. Like many other industrial
countries, Japan had experienced a long and gradual decline of
mortality at least for most of this century. Fertility had also begun
to decline gradually since about 1920. The return of many servicemen
from overseas after 1945 temporarily reversed the decline of fertility
as the country experienced something of a baby-boom. Given the severe
destruction suffered in the war, and the great economic hardships in
the immediate post-war period, however, many women opted for abortion,
and the government saw a rising health problem from inadequate medical
facilities. The government acted swiftly to make safe abortion
possible, fertility declined rapidly in the 1950s, and before 1960
Japan had completed the demographic transition from high to low death
and birth rates.
Singapore's recent demographic history more resembles that of the less
developed regions of the world. Mortality and fertility were both
relatively high as late as 1950. New medical and public health
facilities brought a rapid decline in mortality, while leaving
fertility high, causing an explosion in the natural rate of growth.
This led Singapore to move toward a modern fertility limitation policy
in the early 1950s, which gained considerable strength and government
support after 1961. With rapid economic development, extensive primary
health care, and an efficient family planning program, Singapore's
fertility fell rapidly to come into line with reduced mortality, and by
the early 1970s the demographic transition had been completed.
For both cities, mortality and fertility reductions were only a first
step. Population momentum and the weakness of the social infrastructure
continued to pose major problems. To address these problems both cities
embarked on ambitious population and development plans. Each strove to
improve port facilities, to encourage new forms of economic activities,
and to provide better housing and social services for the population.
Given their physical locations, however, the population-development
strategies were quite different. Singapore began an ambitious project
to build high-rise subsidized housing for its population. Government
took advantage of the extensive land availability outside the city
center and began to build new communities to provide affordable housing
and good social and commercial services. To expand port facilities,
Singapore began dredging to create deep water wharves. Associated with
one of these complexes at Jurong was a new industrial site with
utilities and rail lines, and apartment-like buildings where
entrepreneurs could rent floors or "flats" to create an innovative
"flatted factories" facility. Industrialization moved rapidly in the
1960s, with what are now familiar products for early industrialization,
such as textiles. Soon these changed to electronics and more high
technology industries, and of course to extensive banking, service and
warehousing activities. Today, Singapore has one of the world's largest
and most efficient ports and is a wealthy city-state with high levels
of human welfare.
Kobe's physical problems were more severe. With literally no place to
go, space had to be created anew. This led to one of the most
remarkable engineering feats of any modern port city. Kobe began to cut
off the tops of some of the Rokko mountains, using the fill to create
an artificial island off the main port. The island, "Port Island" would
be ringed by container port facilities and it would have apartments for
more than 20,000 people, with facilities for modern economic activities
such as fashions and pearls, and a world class sports facility. Where
the tops of the mountains had been cut to provide fill for the island,
new towns were built, and connected to the central city by efficient
rail and bus lines. Kobe's "Mountains to the Sea" project proved so
successful, that soon a second island, Rokko Island was planned
alongside of the original Port Island.
Perhaps the most striking differences in the two development
strategies, however, lies in their financing. In Kobe, the central
government provided resources for the sea wall and some of the port
work. Most of the work, however, was financed by municipal bonds sold
on the German bond market. In this, Kobe was to be most fortunate. The
bonds were sold in the late 1960s when world trade was expanding
rapidly, but prices were remaining remarkably stable. The bonds would
be redeemed after the sale of port facilities on the island in the late
1970s and early 1980s, by which time the rise of oil prices had brought
worldwide inflation, greatly reducing the burden of repaying the bonds.
In the process, of course, Kobe's port facilities improved greatly and
it was transformed from a bottleneck to an engine of national
development, bringing rapid economic development to Japan and a high
level of welfare to its citizens.
Singapore was forced to use a more internal, "bootstraps" method of
financing. With a high proportion of the labor force employed as a wage
and salaried force, the colonial government had earlier created an
Employee's Provident Fund (EPF). Workers contributed 25% of their
wages, and the employer contributed another 25%, giving the city-state
something close to a 50% savings rate, with capital mobilized in a
highly concentrated government institution. Government borrowed funds
from the EPF to construct the subsidized apartments that would relieve
the housing shortage without driving up the cost of labor. The
subsequent rapid economic development raised the value of land,
attracted many external investors, and Singapore was off and running on
a process where success breeds more success.
These were very different experiences in some respects, but they also
show important similarities. The identification and observation of
these helped to shape the future aims and direction of AUICK.
*1. See below for a fuller explanation of this problem.
*2. Though independent only in 1965, Singapore began to have
substantial control over its own internal development with home rule,
and the electoral success of the People's Action Party in 1961.
a) Lessons Learned
1. Stable Leadership. Vision and long term
commitment characterized the top leadership and administrators of both
cities. Singapore's leaders had no other place to go, or to attract
them away. They were intelligent and visionary and planned for the long
term. The same was true of Kobe's leadership. Mayor Miyazaki had
already been with the city government for decades, and had been mayor
since 1969. He and his staff were committed to Kobe's development. The
senior staff had served for decades and knew all parts of the city
well. In neither city were administrators or leaders using the city as
a stepping stone to other and higher positions.
2. Room for planning. Singapore could not develop
an effective plan as long as the city and the island were two separate
units. The newly elected Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, abolished the
distinction, welding the administrative system into a single
island-wide instrument. Kobe also needed more physical room for
effective planning, but the process of expansion was more difficult.
Through a series of protracted and delicate negotiations between the
City, surrounding towns, the Prefecture and the national government,
Kobe absorbed some of the small surrounding towns, giving it ample room
for its ambitious urban planning.
3. Dedicated organizations. Both cities created
special organizations to promote the population-development planning.
Kobe had a special Port Authority to promote port development, and the
city assumed responsibility for housing. Singapore created a Housing
and Development Authority to house the population along with creating
the economic infrastructure needed for development. In the Ministry of
Finance there was also an Economic Development Board responsible for
overall development planning. All of these organizations were given
specific tasks, authority and resources and could be held accountable
for achieving the goals set for them. In all cases these were local
organizations, whose specific strategies and tactics were designed to
solve local problems. They were also staffed by people with long
experience in the city and thus with an intimate knowledge of the
problems and of the administrative capacities to deal with those
problems. Development models were not dictated from above by federal or
external government offices.
4. Combined human and economic development. Close
attention was paid to the com bined problems of promoting both economic
development and human welfare. While economic development was being
aggressively pursued, housing was being provided, and investments were
made in health and education.
Running through all of these lessons was the observation that what
urban administrators did in addressing their problems would be critical
to the success or failure of the efforts.
Urban administration and administrators were seen as
the front lines in the effort to promote population and development
initiatives.
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